The article discusses judicial activism in the light of research into the attitudes of English judges, and a comparator group of US judges, towards judicial selection, judicial training and sentencing practice. Noting commonalities and shared perspectives, it is argued that the findings indicate enduring features of occupational culture that originate in relations within the legal workgroup and the practical craft of judging. Against the context of highly conventional attitudes, a conservative form of judicial activism is found in respect of resistance to legislative and policy innovation.
Selection, training, and sentencing have long featured in society's concerns about the judiciary. Efforts to make the selection process less obscure have given way to controversies over means to increase minority and female representation. Training is limited and intermittent. While judges see themselves as guardians of the public interest, the public often criticises sentences. Against what they may regard as ill-informed criticisms, judges have sincere if well-practised rebuttals, but research documenting them is sparse, as Genn's 2009 Hamlyn lectures highlighted (Genn 2009 ). This article examines judicial perspectives on preparation for, and practice of, the judicial role, drawing empirically on fieldwork with judges, and analytically on the literature on judgecraft and procedural justice, to identify a conservative form of judicial activism.
As Moorhead and Cowan (2007: 316) note, 'social scientific approaches to judges have often looked at macro issues '. Tata (2007: 427) observes that the principal analytic approaches under-represent practice on the ground, relying on official discourses for evidence: the legal-rational position on reported judgments, the new penology on policy pronouncements. The most-researched topic -sentencing -largely addresses outcomes, employing statistical analysis, simulations, and econometric modelling. Such research offers limited insight into the play of motivations and values. It cannot offer much sense of how entry to the judiciary is motivated and negotiated, how training does or does not address doubts and weaknesses, and how those tasked with interpreting law and making sentencing decisions respond to criticism and controversy. This article occupies that ground by applying judges' views to our understanding of 'judgecraft' (Moorhead and Cowan 2007:315) and the contemporary place of judicial activism.
Outsiders are apt to regard the judge's role as that of balanced, neutral arbitration. In the common law tradition, the criminal trial is regarded as a contest between parties, and the 3 judge, referee-like, holds the ring, seeking to ensure a 'level playing field' so the contest can be decided solely on the merits of the parties' respective cases. In legal theory, too, this is an important doctrine, extending the idea of neutral arbitration by laying down that the best guarantee of neutrality is for judges to exercise their role relatively passively. But the 'passive arbiter' (Fuller 1978) idea has increasingly fallen under empirical and conceptual critique. This article understands the judicial role as a craft embedded in the work of the legal profession. It will argue that judges are more active 'shapers' of the trial process than the passive arbiter idea suggests. It will demonstrate that, despite the highly conventional views of a sample of English and US judges about the judicial role and the best means of preparation for it, there is nevertheless an orientation to correcting the effects of what is seen as wrongheaded legislation and ill-informed public opinion.
Empirical grounds to question the passive arbiter idea are well-established. Galanter et al (1979:701) document trial court judges who 'played an active entrepreneurial role in the deployment process'. They 'mobilize [d] an agenda of cases' by orientation to non-precedent and non-legal decision making criteria, broadly, their sense of social good. Activist judges have a 'broad role orientation enabling the play of "non-legal" decision criteria' (Gibson 1978) . Understanding the routes by which judges enter the profession, and their perspectives on the courts' social role, illuminates their role orientation, to which Galanter et al (1979: 702) add a central feature of the judgecraft perspective -'situational variables and institutional context'. Whereas the 'prototypical common law trial judge ... applies preexisting general rules to the facts of a specific controversy in accordance with specified procedures' (ibid), disregarding any implications of outcomes for wider public policy, Galanter et al (1979: 706-8) highlight judges who are willing to determine matters of policy independently, engage in doctrinal innovation, and take an active role in case management.
Their posture is less the umpire with binding decisive authority than that of the fixer who arranges settlements the parties can agree, and who works according to the particularity of cases rather than the general rules. This article finds qualities of the 'prototypical common law trial judge' in combination with a form of judicial activism. Galanter et al (1979: 729-30 ) demonstrated that taking a position in strict adherence to legal formalism, but that drastically differs from the wider court community and interested lay onlookers, can constitute unacceptable deviance, suggesting that situational context can trump legal formalism. This led them to recognise a local culture of legal actors and significant audiences sharing a set of understandings and concerns that define the appropriate style of playing judicial roles. Rather than negating legal formalism they treat it as a courtroom resource for advancing the ends about which an activist stance has been adopted. Galanter et al (1979) attributed growing judicial activism to more policy-oriented legal education, concerns over increasing bureaucratization of court administration, and pressure from organised litigant groups. One of their judges tellingly remarked 'I gave up a lucrative private practice to sit on the bench ... I'm not going to sit here and stick my head in the sand'. This sits well with the present study, where a sample of jurists who bear highly conventional attitudes nevertheless testified to activist perspectives that they squarely attributed to feeling obliged to resist a succession of 'bad' governments that had legislated 'bad law'. This broader conception of judicial activism exists between the micro-level of 'judgecraft' and the macro-level of Galanter et al's 'campaigning' judge as political figure.
Thus located, it sees judges as self-aware role incumbents in a system that functions as a centrifugal mechanism not only propelling cases (and the wider social issues associated with them) into the courts but also projecting the courts' work out to 'the wider world of disputing and regulating' (Galanter 1983: 118) .
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The impetus felt by the judges in the present study to resist recent legislation is the more important against the context of Galanter's 'legal alchemy '(1983: 123) . What happens at court sustains other kinds of 'ordering' far beyond its precincts. Thus, 'law is more capacious as a system of cultural and symbolic meanings than as a set of operative controls. It affects us primarily through communication of symbols -by providing threats, promises, models, persuasion, legitimacy, stigma, and so on' (Galanter 1983: 127) . In the gradual emergence of authoritative law from 'indigenous law' (Galanter 1983: 131) , multiple sources of norms stand alongside each other, are loosely meshed and sometimes in conflict. As a system with centrifugal and centripetal flow, the effects of both are inflected in the other.
Judges stand on the pivot point of indigenous and authoritative law. Passivity and activism can take both progressive and conservative forms in the practice of judgecraft.
Methods
This article draws on interviews with 25 English crown court judges, including 6 recorders, and on group discussions between a total of 10 American state judges and 9 English crown court judges facilitated by video teleconferencing. All but one of the judges individually interviewed was of white ethnicity, all but one was male, and most were age 50 or older.
American judges had age profiles similar to those of English judges but were more diverse in gender and ethnicity.
The literature on interviewing elites (see Fielding 2002) indicates that respondents like judges and lawyers are alert to status and expect to be interviewed by individuals of similar standing who are knowledgeable about legal work. They are averse to standardised research instruments, preferring a conversational format. Accordingly, semi-standardised 6 interviews were conducted in 'guided conversation' mode, with topic lists pre-circulated.
Respondents received transcripts for feedback.
Methodological research also indicates that elite respondents seldom participate in group discussions, due to busy schedules, legal/professional constraints, and reluctance to travel to participate alongside less-elevated respondents. To conduct group discussions between American and English judges, I used Access Grid, which does not suffer the lag of conventional teleconferencing and displays life-size images of participants (see Fielding and Macintyre 2005) . I acted as moderator at the UK site; a research fellow moderated at US sites. Transcripts were fed back. Like several judgecraft studies with similar sample size (e.g. Another critical perspective relates to judicial diversity. Rackley (2007) questions accepted understandings of judges and judging in order to critique official attempts to engender diversity solely by categorical means -selecting more individuals from underrepresented categories. True diversity would be a diversity of thought that freed judges from 'the imaginative hold of familiar yet particular images that infuse and distort current discourses on adjudication' (Rackley 2007: 74) . Our understanding of judging has not gotten to grips with female (or minority) judges, whose 'inescapable deviance from the judicial norm disrupts the homogeneity of the bench, revealing the unavoidable, yet largely unacknowledged, gender dimension to traditional understandings of adjudication' (Rackley 2007: 76-7) . Rackley (2007: 75) demonstrates the 'isolation, hostility and exclusion' faced by female judges, from several decades ago in the US up to Brenda Hale's appointment in 2004.
Rackley's position speaks to our relative ignorance about judges' on-the-job thinking.
The present study suggests that judges take an 'activist' position on one thing -'wrongheaded' legislation -but are otherwise conventional in outlook. The randomlyselected sample produced a group whose views are similar to Griffith's (1977: That story, told publicly in ceremonial occasions and less formally in professional discourse and to researchers, is that despite slow change towards categorical diversity, there remains 'a belief voiced by some of our most senior judges that we have one of the best judiciaries in the world, if not the best ... undoubtedly incorruptible; seriously intelligent; extraordinarily industrious; and fiercely independent' (Hale 2005: 282) . Where found, these are obviously virtues, but the concern is that they may often be linked to unspoken beliefs that the best suited will be 'well bred, well spoken, well educated white males' (ibid). Against that, the sturdiest case for diversity is that people of minority backgrounds will bring underrepresented experience and perspectives to judicial office (Malleson 2006b ). But diversity's potential to 'transform understandings of the judge and judging' (Rackley 2006: 86) is little regarded. Established judges are apt to regard the promotion of diversity as spurred by policy rather than merit. Diversity profoundly challenges the fiction of judicial impartiality. Difference undermines the judge as 'neutral arbiter'. Attempts to discredit minority judges in cases relating to their particular minority tacitly point up the equivalence of 'impartiality' to 'mainstream status'. This is not a perspective that lawyers or judges may find comfortable, nor one that victims, witnesses and defendants are likely to bring to their understanding of the trial or expectations about what will influence its outcome. They will assume that courtroom professionals bring high technical expertise to bear and that decisions are based on legal knowledge (Fielding 2006) rather than reflecting particular values, mainstream or otherwise.
Nor will they expect matters to be determined by a refined version of the bargaining encountered in street markets, car dealerships and share dealing rooms. Still less will they expect that, for courtroom professionals, the proceedings are routine, even boring (Mack and Anleu 2007) , with one of Cowan and Hitchings' (2007: 363) judges describing his work as 'largely instinctive rather than intellectual'. The courts are generally successful in not letting the veil drop, but this is not to deny that what may sound like arcane and sophisticated argument to outsiders may be known to insiders as routine and perfunctory. Nor need we worry much about this, except when workgroup practices generate their own imperatives beyond legal considerations. The point is that we cannot detect that such a line has been crossed without knowing more about how judges understand their role.
Motivations
One cannot aspire to judicial employment with any confidence of success. Judicial appointment may not be a career goal, but a number of judges spoke of longstanding attraction towards a legal career. This respondent offered a particularly rich account in terms of social concerns. 'I was born in [mining area] and I can remember age five going out on my bike with my father, seeing small children in the rain in a colliery village playing football without any shoes and socks on. In February. And this affronted me, and so I had a childhood 11 vision, which continues sometimes, that I was going to put the world to rights. The turning point really was ... seeing the film of the Archer-Shee case ... "The Winslow Boy"' (J23).
It is long-documented that a factor in choosing law is having a close relative in the career (Blaustein and Porter 1954) . The sole ethnic minority and female interviewees both had such connections. The former had 'always been interested in the law' as his father was a lawyer. His account combined the pragmatic, professional and moral elements we generally encountered. 'The judicial appointment is really a logical progression of being a barrister ...
[W]e do well financially but there is a public duty argument of giving something back ...
[W]e all reach a stage where you want to do something slightly different ... And overall the job that judges are asked to do is fairly interesting' (J3). As to the female judge, 'my father's wig and gown were in my dressing up box when I was a child ... [H]e always .. told funny stories about his time as a young criminal lawyer ... So that gave me the idea. And then didn't do law at university, I wanted to act, professionally, and my father said "it would be a good idea to get some qualifications first". I rather reluctantly went off and did the Bar exams ... Acting and law require some of the same qualities' (J14).
In our respondents' testimony 'judging' is seldom a motivating factor early in a legal career, with intentions often resulting from judges' or other lawyers' suggestions. 'It was virtually offered ... I'd applied for silk and hadn't got it and ... one could go and ...see the person involved in the Lord Chancellor's Department to discuss future prospects ... "Well, why don't you just apply for the bench instead". And so I did. I didn't want to carry on as I was ... An ordinary criminal hack. A rather declining profession as you get old' (J18). Judges often described their career path as 'unusual', perhaps to signal that they were exceptions to the caricature of judges born to privilege and an easy path to elite status. 'I'd got a scholarship to grammar school ... and so when I first got in [to the Bar], life was really difficult ... I would teach every evening at polytechnics, I had an Indian student at weekends, I wrote for the solicitors' journal' (J2).
The judge who had 'always' been 'totally inspired' by the early experiences recounted above said it was 'only when people said ... "you jolly well ought to apply to be a Recorder"' that he considered judicial appointment. One might assume his account would inspire particular objectives. 'I had some "non-objectives". I didn't want to find myself engaged in the rat race ... I'd been Queen's Counsel for some years and done civil cases involving setting out at 5 o'clock in the morning and I felt "this isn't the life for me. I don't want to be some kind of senior advocate earning more than (inaudible) a year". I did want to bring a fresh view to the judiciary in the sense of outwardness' (J23). There was some orientation to advancing women's interests in the female English judge's account, if expressed ironically. Her objectives were 'just to try and do it well and ... I suppose one had a hope of dispelling the image of ... male middle class Oxbridge by being female middle class Oxbridge' (J14). One ethnic minority US judge cited wanting to address 'evidence of racial disparities in mandatory sentencing' (AG: J1). That it was only the female interviewee and ethnic minority respondents who commented at all in these terms suggests that advancing the interests of disadvantaged groups may indeed be more of a motivating factor amongst minority judges.
If improved service to underprivileged people flows from greater recruitment from such groups, numbers having suitable ability are critical. For instance, males and females do not have greatly different rates of non-renewal of practice certificates, but the age difference in non-renewal is dramatic: 52 for men, 40 for women. Progression is a definite factor; 'female progression into senior positions appears to be a slow trickle up, rather than a constant and widening stream' (Webley and Duff 2007: 375) . A substantial impediment to 13 female (and other minority) advancement is professional culture, with women penalised for motherhood in a way that men are not for fatherhood. Webley and Duff (2007) argue that only 'a wider values-based approach to professional identity' would change females' position. They found pigeonholing that impeded progression to judicial office by denying female lawyers the same breadth of cases, and appearance before as many judges, as male lawyers, circumstances that ex-military advocates cited to us for their own delayed entry to judicial office.
Webley and Duff also report male lawyers' concerns relating to profit maximisation and the commodification not only of legal services but of the workforce. All our judges observed that judicial pay is inferior to that of senior partners. If there are concerns about over-emphasis on profit, the judicial path may appeal to those driven primarily by a sense of service or those who value work/life balance. The latter featured more in our judges' expressed motivations than the lofty ideals we naively expected -the only responses approaching such terms were quoted earlier. We had not anticipated so clear a focus on working conditions. Thus, 'having a regular life and very short hours compared to the Bar, shouldn't say that but it is, and you do get an awful lot of time, your own time, which is very nice' (J4). Several issues motivating our judges were also cited by Webley and Duff's respondents, including the long hours culture (2007: 384-92) , limited sense of personal autonomy (ibid: 392-3), and not being made to feel their work was valued and brought status in the workplace and wider society (ibid: 393). Balancing our judges' instrumentality, all also testified to satisfaction in bearing a role that was important to social cohesion, a position consistent with an activism confined to opposing 'bad law'.
Judicial selection
Obscure grounds for judicial selection long raised concerns, and although those running the avowedly 'transparent' new system cite 'merit' as prime they are still working at defining it (current selection criteria appear at http://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk). Creating a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) has not resolved controversy over selection (Malleson 2006a (Malleson , 2006b 35% of applicants (N=891) were female, of whom 34% were selected; 13% were ethnic minority, of whom 8% were selected; and 8% were disabled, of whom 7% were selected.
Perspectives expressed by the present sample appear to reflect its compositionbroadly consistent with the prevailing characteristics of the contemporary judiciary. The effects on judicial activism cannot be evidenced via this sample but Moran (2006: 566) argues that having acknowledged that female, ethnic minority and disabled judges bring perspectives that reveal the contingent nature of conventions that seem intuitive to those of mainstream backgrounds, the same applies to those having minority sexual orientations. Hard data on judicial sexuality is limited. To my knowledge our judges were heterosexual, inferred from gendered personal pronouns when responding to questions on the work's impact on home life. References to non-heterosexuality were few and were peripheral aspects of response (as in a US judge's comment later about a homosexual's petition for civil partnership rights). As Moran (2006: 577) remarks, 'silence is a device by which ... heterosexuality as the norm is (re)produced in society ... and in the institution of the judiciary'. Two of Moran's gay judicial respondents instanced the effect that openness about their own sexuality had on cases relating to sexuality. In one it undermined alarmist evidence from a reactionary organisation. and prompted efforts to develop relevant skills. There was reading of legal texts, but facets of temperament and disposition, and practical skills like preparing notes for summing-up, were developed more idiosyncratically. In our respondents' accounts, the prime training was exposure in a legal career to a range of cases, courts, judges and sentencing considerations, thus subordinating what one judge pointedly called 'post-appointment training' (J24).
Moreover, training seemed largely a venue facilitating co-learning. 'We have very regular judicial training seminars and ... discuss cases and approaches. The idea ... is that we learn from each other. We discuss ... to a certain theme' (J1). With the emphasis on experiential learning and co-learning, one might expect a practice of sitting in on other judges' courtrooms. However, there is a convention against this. Discussing judicial activism a judge advised 'you'd be much better to ask barristers, because convention means that once we take this job we don't go and sit in the court of somebody else. And so we don't know how other people do it' (J6). The convention forms a compelling etiquette. 'I never sit in another judge's court ... [O] nce I was specifically directed to listen to a newly-appointed Assistant Recorder ... I don't like doing that because I think it unnerves them' (J7).
Thus an informal, experientially-oriented learning mode was preferred, one largely in the hands of the workgroup. Several judges emphasised dining conversation. 'There's a lot of discussion around the lunch table ... We all discuss, at lunch' (J13). Cowan and Hitchings' (2007: 369) district judges also '[sought] out their peers for informal meals and discussion' and used an intranet system 'as a source of training and solace'. Even judges with training roles, like this induction course tutor, did not accord training primacy in imparting norms for judicial style: '[Style] is a topic that's touched on ... but not to any great extent because there's so much that has to be got in' (J19).
Our concern to understand influences on how judges conduct trial interventions originated in its effect on lay participants' experiences and led to the concern with judicial activism. As well as Galanter's activists there is the view that 'neutrality may be promoted by constructive intervention' ( (Moorhead 2007: 417) , with procedural justice research suggesting fairness is not assured simply by formal process (Lind and Tyler 1988) . 'By the time a case reaches trial ... extraneous issues to law, but important to the parties, have been, at least partly, divorced from each other ... marginalising the parties' (Moorhead and Cowan 2007: 315) . Hood (1992) and Shute et al. (2005) highlight the particular difficulties of minority lay participants.
International criminal justice also suggests that the 'detached and disengaged "blank Whilst you're a Recorder you'll be concentrating on your performance ... But these sorts of intervention ... are really as in-built as the way in which you lecture. You don't talk to your colleagues about the process of lecturing, you'll talk about content but not the process. We're like that' (J13).
Judges described the need to intervene in terms of 'conduct' rather than technical matters (law, procedure) -'if things are going badly awry or counsel's delaying or being irritating' (J11). Mack and Anleu (2007) found that judges exercised craft skills to enable greater engagement with lay participants. Describing herself as 'very interventionist', this judge would identify the key point and tell counsel. Asked if counsel cooperated she said 'they have to', but emphasised negotiation. 'Some of them do resent it but ... as counsel I used to find it helpful if the judge did indicate the way they were thinking ... Of course on a very difficult point ... you listen to everything before you say anything' (J14). Nearly all respondents explained law or procedure only when counsel failed to, exceptions being recorders. Despite official encouragement to be more interventionist, judges wish to leave it to counsel wherever possible. Workgroup relations better explain this than a model where discretion only governs areas not covered by rules. In this context, note that all of Kritzer's elements most relevant to preparation for the judicial role -skills and techniques, problem- should be asking themselves' (J3). This more modest role concept reflects part-time status and inexperience: 'being a part-timer one is more reluctant to [intervene] ... in case one gets it wrong' (ibid). Rather than saving the public from bad law, recorders were preoccupied with getting law right by adhering to guidance. A yearning for combat rather than refereeing may lie behind judges' accounts of battling philistine governments, but for recorders there was satisfaction in stepping outside the adversarial process. 'At the bar all one does is focus on how to win your case ... The judge's function is fundamentally different' (ibid). Thomas' (2010) analysis of 68,000 crown court verdicts and a series of mock trials found that twothirds of jurors admitted to not fully understanding the judge's legal directions. The recorders' approach may better address the needs of lay participants in the trial process but the established judges' gaze is on government.
Belief in mending the failings of bad law is an important counterweight to the threat of change. For several judges, increased attention to judicial management (Moorhead and Cowan 2007: 318) was to be cheerfully dismissed. 'We all suffer from KPIs these days ... No doubt there'll come a time when we shall lose some, the boot will go in, but the judges are used to being the scapegoats and it's water off a duck's back' (J25). So it may be, when there are no performance indicators beyond clearing the day's list and the main sanction for bad performance -appeal -is a rare event (Cowan and Hitchings (2007: 379) . Hostility to mandatory sentencing, actuarial approaches to risk assessment, or other prescriptive frameworks (Tata 2007) can be seen as a countervailing force against moves from occupational to organizational control of the profession.
Like any group adapted to its workplace, judges establish practices that reflect and protect workgroup interests. Such practices do not necessarily infringe lay participants' interests. However, workgroups are apt to elide their members' interests with those of their clients. Resistance to changes aiming to shift the fulcrum more in favour of lay participants often stems from conviction that conventions represent a 'natural' balance of interests, such as the complaint that video-link testimony denies defendants sight of their accuser. Moorhead's (2007) 'ideologies of judging' are more than 'convention' and 'workgroup interests'. Perhaps obstructing wrong-headed parliamentarians and philistine bureaucrats tapped a little into these ideologies, counteracting a purely instrumental account of 'interests'.
Certainty that judges knew best how to balance interests prompted adamant views on whether sentencing should reflect public opinion, with more than one judge referring to Pontius Pilate's pandering to public opinion in the trial of Jesus, and scathing references to 25 'pressure groups'. 'There's a volatility about the views of the public and although judges must stay in touch with public opinion ... they need to be careful that they don't move with every whim ... We're all members of this society, we do have our fingers largely on the pulse, but it would be a very poor sentencing practice to reflect the views of the general public' (AG: J13). Informing this view is hostility to infringements of judicial independence that marks the conservative activist's resistance to government interference. You can't give them sentences that reflect guilt, you can't balance' (ibid). There is a rationale here beyond sociology's primordial suspicion of judicial discretion ('many judges resent the straitjacket that codes and legislation seek to impose on their wish to maintain an easy or "muddling through" fluidity' ; Riesman 1957: 458-9) . Discretion is not so much self-serving as attentive to logics alternative to those informing mandatory sentencing, an 'aesthetic' attending to the judiciary's several 'audiences' (Baum 2006) , from immediate parties to other professionals and wider society.
Seeking conceptual tidiness, the legal-rational and new penological approaches condense the empirical complexity of actual working practices around artificially stark distinctions, treating as polar opposites things that are mutually inflected. In practice, binaries like rules versus discretion, and consistency versus individualisation 'co-exist dynamically [and] are synergistic' ( Tata 2007: 427) . However, weakening the rules/discretion binary does not mean ignoring dysfunctions of bad law or self-serving discretion. Rather, it demands closer scrutiny of craftwork logic in particular cases. 'What we call "rules" and "discretion" contribute to a reservoir of account-giving resources to be used as a legitimating justification for different courses of action ' (Tata 2007: 430) . This is a crucial point both in sentencing (giving reasons being a critical control on judges; Thomas 1963 ) and for analysing judgecraft (by problematising naive 'naturalism' in interpreting field data; Scott and Lyman 1968) . Tata (2007: 432) remarks that 'anyone who interviews judges about their decision making will have been frustrated by [an] inability of judges to explain clearly how they came to the judgment they did'. Rationales based on penological theories are elusive. The beacon in this landscape is Hogarth (1971) , but as Tata demonstrated, Hogarth leapt from the finding that sentencers frame their judgments selectively to the assumption that this relates to penological preferences. Moreover, Hogarth construes sentencing as the work of individual sentencers in isolation from peers. Activism tells us of local legal cultures, and judgecraft highlights collaborative shaping in workgroups. In the interests of treating each case as 'uniquely individual, and dealt with by a unique individual craftworker', but also attentive to their standing in the judicial community, judges seek to inscribe a personal signature on the 'product' of their craft. The idea of individual sentencers as attentive to multiple audiences is promising in identifying sources of sentencing disparity. This is the ground of judgecraft and its workgroup-based domain is threatened only by public and governmental interference, eliciting a conservative activism directed to preserving the status quo.
Our fieldwork with judges suggests they feel obliged to be vigilant against: attempts to constrain discretion in the name of a public convinced the judiciary generally gets sentences wrong, poorly-drafted law requiring over-interpretation to be workable, and an executive that cuts necessary resources. This is a judicial activism concerned to protect the trial process from influence by conflicts other than those between opposing parties. Such judicial perspectives suggest an occupational culture bearing values supporting resistance to outside influence. The implication is not only that judgecraft as well as formal legal factors affects procedures and outcomes but that the workgroup is marked by values directly 29 inhibiting prospects for change in accommodating lay participants' interests.
